What's about nuclear proliferation?
- Helena S.
- Jun 14
- 7 min read
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is one of the main threats to global security.
Despite progress in limiting the development of such weaponry through international treaties, in recent years countries continue to use nuclear weapons to achieve their objectives related to their international political agendas.
States seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical) in order to influence the politics of other states. Deterrence is an important tool in international politics, and since the Cold War, states have regarded nuclear weapons as the most effective deterrent power mechanism, assuming that possessing them will make the cost of war too high and will prevent other states from initiating or seeking conflict with a nuclear-capable state.
Today, the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons (China, North Korea, the United States, France, India, Pakistan, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Russia) are engaged in expanding and/or modernizing their arsenals. This is related to the balance of power in the international sphere and to the concept of deterrence, which, according to Schelling’s (1966) conceptualization, is the military strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from carrying out a specific action.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) represents the global effort to prevent the spread and development of nuclear weapons, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to advance the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
The first NPT entered into force in 1978, and in 1995 it was extended indefinitely. Initially, 191 territories were part of the NPT, under which non-nuclear-weapon states committed not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states pledged not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons (Source: IAEA.org).

Currently, 145 states have signed these agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), subjecting their nuclear material, facilities, and sensitive activities to scrutiny by inspectors. The IAEA’s protocols and safeguards system have been strengthened over the years, especially following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program and subsequent findings of undeclared nuclear materials in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Despite the NPT’s indefinite extension, a Review Conference is held every five years, where states debate and reach new agreements to improve the non-proliferation regime.
The NPT has three main objectives, which are the pillars of its purpose: to control the spread of nuclear weapons among states outside the P5 group (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China); to negotiate the reduction of nuclear arsenals with the aim of complete elimination; and to share the benefits of specific nuclear applications.
The future outlook for controlling weapons of mass destruction is not optimistic.
Firstly, the NPT failed to halt the second wave of nuclearization during the 1990s in territories such as India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.
Secondly, the NPT does not convince all states, as illustrated by North Korea’s withdrawal in 2003 and the United States’ departure from certain related agreements during Trump’s administration in 2018.
Finally, the potential for trafficking and the risk that terrorist groups could gain control of such weaponry represent a serious threat to international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
Regarding the weak level of compliance with the NPT's pillars, several influencing factors must be considered.
Firstly, the pursuit of prestige by states has been linked to nuclear weapons. Some countries associate the status of a modern state or great power in international politics with the possession of such weapons. This argument helps explain why the first five nuclear-armed states (the aforementioned P5) have been the most influential in the post-war international system and are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
It is also important to consider that nuclear weapons serve as instruments of political negotiation. For example, some former Soviet republics used their possession of nuclear weapons to gain political and economic concessions—just as North Korea has done in its dealings with Western countries.
In summary, it can be stated that the NPT has failed to control the spread of nuclear weapons among countries outside the P5 group (the first pillar), suggesting that the upcoming review conference may conclude without substantial agreements. Furthermore, ongoing conflicts and regional tensions among P5 countries create fertile ground for risks to the global non-proliferation regime architecture.
The US, Iran, and North Korea (Rogue States)
In the mid-1960s, Shah Reza Pahlavi established an ambitious nuclear program in Iran, both civilian and military, which aimed to build, by the end of the 20th century, 23 nuclear power plants along with the necessary facilities for the full fuel cycle—from uranium mining to plutonium reprocessing. The military side of the program sought to use civilian infrastructure to produce a small arsenal of plutonium-based atomic bombs.
In 1970, Iran signed the NPT while simultaneously developing its nuclear program with knowledge transferred by the United States under President Eisenhower’s "Atoms for Peace" initiative, which provided assistance in the field of nuclear energy.
By the late 1970s, the Islamic Revolution brought a new fundamentalist government to Iran, increasing the likelihood that the civilian nuclear program could be redirected for potential military use.
North Korea, for its part, began its own nuclear program in the 1970s with the goal of acquiring a small nuclear arsenal, initially supported by the USSR and China, and with key assistance from Pakistan.
In 1985, after signing the NPT, North Korea launched a clever strategy of ambiguity—especially with the United States—by alternately signing and denouncing agreements in order to buy time to develop nuclear weapons. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, and three years later it conducted its first nuclear test using a plutonium bomb. This led to a series of economic and security sanctions imposed by the international community.

The United States has consistently played a watchdog role regarding Iran and North Korea for strategic reasons. In both cases, it was the U.S. that identified the construction of suspicious facilities believed to be related to atomic bomb development (in Iran in 2002, and in North Korea in 1989).
The Biden administration aimed to prevent a new arms race by restoring the U.S.’s credibility as a leader in arms control. As part of this effort, it announced its intention to revive the Iran nuclear deal, which had been abandoned by President Trump during his previous term.
Russia's Nuclear Power
After the Soviet Union's first nuclear test in 1949 and its first thermonuclear test in 1953, the Soviet armed forces were equipped with nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, artificial Earth satellites, computers, and automated control systems, among others.Among these major advancements, the acquisition of nuclear weapons was the most decisive factor affecting Soviet military strategy, as it altered the nature, methods, and rules of strategic engagement with its eternal rival, the United States.
Since 2011, Russia has pursued a deterrence policy by initiating the review and modernization of its nuclear arsenal. The decision to upgrade Russia’s nuclear forces was driven by internal institutional interests and the capacity of the military and defense industry to implement new projects.

According to SIPRI data, as of January 2022, Russia maintained a military stockpile of approximately 4,477 nuclear warheads, despite Moscow's lack of transparency. Despite the various non-proliferation treaties signed by Russia with the United States since 1972 (SALT I, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or ABMT, SALT II, START I, START II, SORT...), Russia remains a major nuclear power, and this status exacerbates the potential consequences of its actions.
Russia's suspension of the START agreement can be interpreted in several ways. The first suggests that we are witnessing the emergence of a new Cold War, in which nuclear weapons once again serve as defining elements alongside the concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction.”During the original Cold War, the presence of nuclear arms underscored the complexity of the antagonism between Russia and the United States and simultaneously deterred open warfare due to the catastrophic consequences their use would entail.
We are once again seeing nuclear deterrence aligned with traditional political realism, and a balance of power between superpowers achieved through the "balance of terror"—the threat of nuclear weapon use. This posture has been further reinforced by the ongoing tensions surrounding the war in Ukraine.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the NPT
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the first multilateral agreement with global applicability that comprehensively bans nuclear weapons. It is also the first treaty to include provisions addressing the humanitarian consequences of the testing and use of nuclear weapons. This treaty complements existing international agreements on nuclear weapons, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Integrating the TPNW with the current control regimes established by the NPT is not expected to be straightforward, due to the nature of both treaties and the contradictions found within their respective texts.
First, as Rietiker points out, the normative foundations differ: the TPNW is grounded in humanitarian ideals and explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons—an approach not found in the NPT. Nevertheless, the TPNW aims to generate a parallel non-proliferation regime alongside the existing one.
Secondly, under the TPNW, disarmament involves a categorical prohibition of nuclear weapons, whereas the NPT outlines a process to be pursued in good faith by its signatory states.
It is also worth noting that the preamble of the TPNW establishes a hierarchy of norms placing the NPT above it, a formulation that appears both inconsistent and confusing for the States Parties.
Finally, the lack of consensus regarding the disarmament procedure and verification mechanisms for treaty members presents another significant challenge.
Conclusion
The development of nuclear weapons by various actors has recently gained momentum, despite the efforts of the international community to eradicate them.
The recent proliferation of nuclear arsenals by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea identifies these states as threats to international peace and security. Furthermore, their withdrawal from agreements and treaties—as well as their weak commitment to existing frameworks (such as the NPT, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the ABM Treaty, or the START agreements)—further reinforces this concern.
Although the fight against nuclear proliferation is more urgent than ever—especially following the escalation of the war in Ukraine, the inflammatory rhetoric of some leaders, and Israel’s attack to eliminate key members of the Iranian nuclear leadership—the paradox is that nuclear deterrence remains in place and is still considered necessary in the current international context.
However, as Frías Sanchez (2015) points out, although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has functioned with reasonable effectiveness, the main reform needed is political in nature because the current United Nations system does not reflect the present distribution of power in the International System. According to the author, the Security Council is not an organizational problem but rather a matter of political will among its members, since non-proliferation is not a primary interest for all, and the politics of the balance of power prevail over any other considerations.
Although this may seem like a naïve argument, nuclear non-proliferation should be approached from a different perspective, separating it from other strategic interests.
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